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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Courts, Congress, and commentators acknowledge that intellectual property law is 
a balance between providing incentives through exclusive rights and encouraging use of 
information through free access to creative works.1  They all also recognize that 
performing this balance is extremely difficult.2  When balancing is difficult, debates often 
turn from careful weighing of competing considerations to ideological arguments. 
¶2 There is a conflict between the competing goals of ensuring access to intellectual 
property at a price equal to marginal cost and providing incentives for the production of 
information.  Finding the balance between access and incentives arising from the free 
access and exclusive rights norms is characterized as the static/dynamic dilemma or the 
short-run/long-run dilemma.3  Free access is desirable, because once the creative work 
 
* David W. Barnes is a Distinguished Research Professor of Law at Seton Hall University School of 
Law. 
1 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“Creative work is to be 
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad 
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”).  In Sony Corp., the Supreme Court held:  
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily 
designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an 
important public purpose may be achieved.  It is intended to motivate the creative activity of 
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to 
the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired. 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).  The Court further explained:  
Congress must consider . . . two questions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the 
producer and so benefit the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be 
detrimental to the public?  The granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and 
conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary 
monopoly.  
Id. at 429 n.10 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909)).  See also Brett Frischmann, Spillovers 
Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 813 n.49 (2009) (“Of course, the 
need to balance incentives and access is nothing new and has been a long-standing feature of intellectual 
property scholarship in general and the economic analysis of intellectual property in particular.”). 
2 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429.  Professor Lemley explains:  
Economic theory does not, however, give us a very clear answer to the question “how much 
control is optimal?” The evidence is so ambiguous that Fritz Machlup once famously told 
Congress that he could not in good conscience recommend either that a patent system be 
created if one did not exist or that it be eliminated if it already did exist. 
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1065 (2005) 
[hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding].  See also Katie Sykes, Towards a Public Justification of Copyright, 61 
U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (“No one can agree on, much less explain, what the correct balance 
should be between incentives to produce and public access to what is produced . . . .”); Richard A. Posner, 
Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 638 (2003) (“Unfortunately it is very difficult to make 
this trade-off [between access and incentives] . . . .”). 
3 Compare Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 
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has been produced (from a “static” perspective), it costs nothing in the short-run for 
another person to benefit from it.  Someone in society can benefit at no cost to society.  In 
the long-run (from a “dynamic” perspective), however, producers must charge a price 
sufficient to cover their costs, including a normal economic profit.  For pure public 
goods, it is impossible to satisfy both goals simultaneously using market forces. 
¶3 Addressing this dilemma between free access and positive incentives is the subject 
not just of scholarly research but also judicial opinions.  Courts justify intellectual 
property law on the ground that incentives are necessary to lead to the production of 
public goods, but the aim is to stimulate creativity to benefit the public.4  The Supreme 
Court described the Patent Clause in Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States 
Constitution as “reflect[ing] a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the 
avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in 
the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”5  The intellectual property statutes reflect 
Congress’s attempts to address “the difficult balance between the interests of authors and 
inventors in the control and exploitation of the writings and discoveries on the one hand, 
and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on 
the other hand . . . .”6  This is essentially the insight from public goods theory as well.7   
¶4 Implementing this goal is notoriously difficult.8  Too little incentive and too much 
access means that society would benefit from diverting resources away from other 
endeavors to encourage more creative work.  Too much incentive and too little access 
means that society would benefit from reducing exclusive rights and investing more 
resources in other projects.9  The problem is how to balance access and incentives.  One 
prominent scholar went so far as to say that economists could tell lawyers virtually 
nothing about the appropriate scope of intellectual property rights.10 
¶5 Intellectual property debates in Congress and the scholarly literature reflect 
opposing normative perspectives.  Under the slogan “Information Wants to Be Free,”11 
 
MINN. L. REV. 917, 947 (2005) [hereinafter Frischmann, Infrastructure] (using the “static/dynamic” 
terminology), with Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs & Bruno Peixoto, Success, Dominance, and 
Interoperability, 84 IND. L.J. 1157, 1197 (2009) (using the “short run/long run” terminology). 
4 See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429; Twentieth Century, 422 U.S. at 156. 
5 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989). 
6 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429. 
7 Professors Conley and Yoo explain in the context of copyright:  
The overwhelming majority of scholarly commentaries on the economics of copyright base 
their claims on the basic insights of public goods theory: that markets systematically produce 
too few public goods and underutilize those that are produced.  Moreover, modeling 
nonrivalry as zero marginal cost leads the literature to frame copyright as an inherent tradeoff 
between optimal incentives to create works and optimal access to works that are created, with 
any feasible solution presumed to be necessarily [sic] second-best in both aspects. 
John P. Conley & Christopher S. Yoo, Nonrivalry and Price Discrimination in Copyright Economics, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1801, 1828–29 (2009). 
8 See supra note 2.  
9 See Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 2, at 1058–59 (identifying the costs of granting overbroad 
property rights as including deadweight losses from too little access by consumers, harm to incentives for 
other artists to create, rent seeking behavior, and administrative costs). 
10 Id. at 1065, n.137 (referring to George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About 
Intellectual Property: Comment on Cheung, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 19, 21 (1986)). 
11 See R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of 
Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 998–99 & n.14 (2003) (arguing that exclusive rights may increase the 
amount of information that is free to all and exploring the origins of the slogan).  Professor Wagner 
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proponents of limited rights emphasize the moral correctness of and social benefits 
obtained by allowing widespread use of intellectual creations.12  “Nothing is more 
fundamental than the right to use ideas and the free access promotes further creation.”  
Alternatively, under the free market banner, proponents of strong exclusive rights argue 
that bargaining for the opportunity to exploit intellectual creations efficiently allocates 
resources to the production of intellectual property.13  Strong exclusive rights promote the 
efficient allocation of resources by providing creators an opportunity to profit from 
satisfying those who are willing and able to pay for access and excluding others. 
¶6 Among the theoretical justifications for the incentives/access tradeoff in intellectual 
property law, public goods theory dominates.  The economics of intellectual property law 
is based on public goods theory.  Scholars frequently conclude that copyrighted 
expressions and patented inventions have the non-rivalrousness and non-excludability 
characteristics of public goods,14 and recent scholarship suggests that trademarked 
symbols also have these characteristics.15  “Non-rivalrous” means that it is costless to 
 
describes the views of adherents of this perspective as follows: 
[C]ontrol-critics emphasize the existence of the “public domain” or “open” information 
(information that is not subject to proprietary rights, offering anyone access, anytime, for low 
or no cost) as a critical source of the informational inputs necessary for creative and 
technological progress.  Much of the intellectual property laws' restrictions on the rights of 
owners—temporal limits, allowances for “fair use,” forced disclosures—can be explained, 
they note, as attempts to build the public domain.  Perceived recent trends of eliminating or 
reducing some of these restrictions, easing enforcement of rights, or the extension of 
intellectual property into new subject matter, fundamentally conflict, the argument goes, with 
the construction of the public domain.  And as goes the public domain, so do our hopes for a 
richer, fuller, and more interesting tomorrow.  
Id. at 998 (citations omitted).  
12 In Graham, the Supreme Court explained:  
That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual 
instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and 
benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, 
without lessening their density at any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and 
have our physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation. 
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 8 n.2 (1966) (quoting and citing THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180–81 (Washington ed.)). 
13 See the discussion of markets for public goods infra Part III.C. 
14 James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 41–42 (2003) (arguing that the distinguishing features of information as property 
are non-rivalrousness and non-excludability); Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual 
Property?  A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 458 (2010) 
(characterizing modern intellectual property scholars as rejecting traditional law associated with physical 
property because information is non-rivalrous and non-excludable). 
15 There has been some scholarly disagreement on whether trademarks are public goods.  Compare 
Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 762 (1990) (“A trademark is not a 
public good . . . .”), and Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 143 (2004) (stating with respect to trademarks that “there is no public goods 
problem for intellectual property to solve”), and William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: 
An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268–70, 274 (1987) (“A proper trademark is not a public 
good; it has social value only when used to designate a single brand.”), with David W. Barnes, A New 
Economics of Trademark, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 22 (2006) [hereinafter Barnes, New Economics] 
(arguing that the non-rivalrousness and non-excludability characteristics of copyrighted expressions and 
patented inventions apply to trademarked symbols as well).  Among other recent scholarly works 
attributing public goods characteristics to trademarks are Margaret Ritzert, Comment, Champagne Is From 
Champagne: An Economic Justification for Extending Trademark-Level Protection to Wine-Related 
Geographical Indicators, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 191, 214 (2009); Ian J. Block, Comment, Hidden Whois and 
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allow additional consumers simultaneously to enjoy the benefits of a public good once it 
has been produced, and “non-excludability” means that producers have a hard time 
getting consumers to pay for the privilege.16   
¶7 While it is desirable for many people to have access to the benefits of public goods 
for free, competitive markets will not supply these goods without the incentives created 
by positive prices.17  According to public goods theory, competitive markets do not 
supply efficient amounts of public goods.18  For intellectual property, the implication of 
public goods theory is that competitive markets will provide insufficient incentives for 
creative activity.  The lack of incentives deprives the public of the benefits of knowledge 
and information. 
¶8 Public goods theory originated as part of public finance economics, which is a 
branch of economics concerned with organizing and paying for government activities.  In 
that field, public goods theory identified circumstances in which competitive markets 
failed to supply goods efficiently and described how governments could address those 
failures by collectively supplying or subsidizing the supply of goods, such as roads, and 
services, such as police and fire protection.  Intellectual property scholars typically refer 
to the public finance literature when describing the tradeoff between the incentives 
resulting from exclusive rights for creators and the benefits of free access to the public.19  
Intellectual property scholars also adopt the normative goal of allocative efficiency 
identified in the public finance literature when discussing the optimal production of 
intellectual property.20 
¶9 Applying the traditional prescriptions of public goods theory is difficult, however, 
because public finance theory was focused on collective rather than private provision of 
goods and services.  Public goods theory focused on how much the collectivity should 
supply—how much should be invested in creative activity—rather than on how to design 
markets to supply the goods privately.  Public finance theory assumed that the costs of 
production would be paid out of taxes or fees assessed by the collectivity (usually the 
state) and that the demand for public goods would be revealed by voting and the political 
process.  Western democracies, however, generally rely on markets to determine the 
demand and supply of public goods, despite the inevitable inefficiencies.  Intellectual 
property law attempts to define the scope, strength, and duration of rights in order to 
enable the market to do the best it can in allocating resources to the production and use of 
intellectual property information.  
 
Infringing Domain Names: Making the Case for Registrar Liability, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 431, 434 
(2008); William M. Landes, Posner on Beanie Babies, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1761, 1772 (2007). 
16 Public goods are not classified as “public” simply because they are supplied by the government.  
Rather, some goods are classified as “public” because their characteristics of non-rivalrousness in 
consumption and non-excludability in production inevitably prevent efficient private market supply. 
17 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003) (“[A] firm is less likely to expend resources on developing a new product if 
competing firms that have not borne the expense of development can duplicate the product and produce it 
at the same marginal cost as the innovator.”). 
18  Barnes, New Economics, supra note 15, at 39–40; Mark Cooper, From Wifi to Wikis and Open 
Source: The Political Economy of Collaborative Production in the Digital Information Age, 5 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 125, 128–29 (2006); Ritzert, supra note 15, at 214–15.  
19 See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 
U. PA. L. REV. 635, 638–43 (2007). 
20 See, e.g., generally, id.; sources cited supra note 15. 
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¶10 Both the economic theory of competitive markets and the economic theory of 
public goods ultimately fail when applied to intellectual property.  The theory of 
exchange of private goods is the economic approach to understanding how markets 
allocate resources by facilitating the transfer of goods and resources from those who 
value them less to those who value them more.  It fails to produce an optimal level of 
access to intellectual property information, because it does not take into account the non-
rivalrous nature of information.  Because many consumers simultaneously and without 
interference benefit from the provision of public goods, it is efficient to permit more 
access than easily enforceable, strong exclusive rights would allow.  The problem of free 
access never arose in pure public goods theory, because supplying another consumer was 
assumed to be costless.  Public goods theory fails, because public finance economics did 
not take into account the non-excludable nature of information.  Public finance 
economists assumed that the government would determine the demand for public goods 
through voting and the political process and encourage the provision of public goods by 
paying producers from tax revenues.21  The problem of incentives never arose. 
¶11 From the theory of exchange and the theory of public goods come three bootless 
principles.  They are bootless not because they are incorrect in context but because they 
are fruitlessly cited as principles for resolving the balance between access and incentives 
in intellectual property law.  These bootless principles are: 
BP #1: From exchange theory: 
Resources are allocated efficiently when price equals marginal cost. 
BP #2: From public goods theory: 
Increasing amounts of public goods should be produced until the marginal rate of 
transformation equals the sum of individuals’ marginal rates of substitution.  
BP #3: From exchange theory: 
If public goods were excludable, private markets could efficiently allocate 
resources to their production. 
These are the sacred cows of intellectual property theory—the foundations for the 
economic analysis of IP rights, in descending order of prominence in the scholarly 
literature.  This article demonstrates the limits to their utility as balancing rules and 
suggests an alternative analytical approach that draws from both theories. 
 
21 Public finance economists were concerned with how to structure taxation to pay for the production of 
public goods in the least distortionate way.  See Erik Lindahl, Just Taxation—A Positive Solution, in 
CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 168 (Elizabeth Henderson trans., Richard A. Musgrave & 
Alan T. Peacock eds., 1958) [hereinafter Lindahl] (describing a financing structure in which different 
consumers are charged different prices—and thus bear a different proportion of the fixed costs—based on 
their marginal valuations of the total quantity); F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 
ECON. J. 47, 58–59 (1927) (describing a pricing structure in which fixed costs are allocated among buyers 
based on the elasticity of their demand, with those buyers with the least elastic demand bearing the heaviest 
burden). 
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¶12 This article derives the competing free access norm and exclusive rights norm from 
pure public goods theory and offers a general rule for mediating between them.  It 
considers competing scholarly standards for defining the optimal scope, strength, and 
duration of intellectual property rights,22 while explaining why a variant on the “cost-
benefit” approach is superior to the alternative “average-cost” approach.   
¶13 Part II of this article considers the characterization of the informational content of 
trademarks, copyrighted expression, and patented inventions as public goods.  Public 
goods are different from private goods in the way they are consumed and the way 
arrangements for their provision need to be structured.  In the basic economic exchange 
theory of private goods, competitive markets more or less automatically provide optimal 
quantities and reward suppliers for their efforts.  In basic public goods theory, 
competitive markets fail to provide optimal quantities of public goods or provide 
sufficient reward for suppliers of public goods.  If the government is going to manage the 
provision of public goods where the competitive market fails, it must figure out what to 
produce and how much.  If markets are to be used to provide public goods, the law must 
be structured to overcome the market failures. 
¶14 The ways in which public and private goods differ in their consumption and 
production affects the structure of intellectual property rights.  Part II also presents the 
fundamental characteristics of public goods (non-rivalrousness and non-excludability), 
discusses the public finance origins of public goods theory in government provision of 
public goods, and describes how opting for market provision of intellectual property 
information necessitates careful delineation of rights.  This section rejects suggestions of 
some scholars that non-excludability should not be considered a characteristic of a public 
good on the grounds that intellectual property law focuses on providing creators with 
financial incentives to produce information.   
¶15 The ability of creators to exclude users who do not pay is critical to the structure of 
intellectual property rights.  The scope of those rights affects people’s incentives to create 
and people’s ability to enjoy the benefits of other’s creativity, reflected in the exclusive 
rights norm and free access norm, respectively.  The correct structure of rights provides 
the optimal amount of incentives and results in the optimal output of creative work.  It 
also provides optimal access to creative work.  The job of intellectual property scholars is 
to find that correct structure of rights. 
¶16 Part III describes the policy dilemma inherent in balancing exclusive rights and free 
access and develops a prescriptive rule for addressing issues involving the scope, 
strength, and duration of intellectual property rights.  It is well-recognized that 
intellectual property policy must consider the balance between incentives and access.  
None of the three basic principles of the theory of exchange and the theory of public 
goods provide a rule for balancing these competing interests, because they insufficiently 
consider the non-rivalrous nature of intellectual property, the difficulty of determining 
how much people benefit from the creation of intellectual property, or the non-exclusive 
nature of intellectual property. 
 
22 Compare Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 2, at 1057 (arguing for intellectual property rights 
sufficient to ensure that creators can cover their average costs), with John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property 
Isolationism and the Average Cost Thesis, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1077 (2005) [hereinafter Duffy, Isolationism] 
(objecting to Lemley’s approach generally, and suggesting that intellectual property be treated more like 
physical property). 
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¶17 Part IV offers a general rule that recommends considering the net benefits from 
extending or contracting rights derived from cost-benefit approaches articulated by other 
scholars.  In application, this requires comparing the incremental benefits from 
information creation resulting from increased rights and from increased access.  Analysis 
underlying the rejection of the three basic principles in Part III informs the net benefit 
analysis.   
¶18 The net benefit approach is similar to judicial approaches in some areas, such as the 
doctrine of equivalents in patent law, and is contrary to judicial approaches taken in other 
current analyses.  Part IV illustrates how the net benefits approach leads to a different 
analysis in two areas: fair use in copyright, which focuses on the effect on the copyright 
owner’s economic opportunities rather than the incremental effect on incentives; and 
Internet initial interest trademark confusion, which often focuses on whether the mark 
owner’s property was “used” rather than the incentives/access tradeoff and rarely on the 
incentive/access tradeoff. 
II. TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS, AND PATENTS AS PURE PUBLIC GOODS 
¶19 Public goods theory is the dominant economic theoretical foundation for 
intellectual property law.  For decades, scholars have routinely referenced public goods 
theory in their discussion of patent and copyright law.23  Recent scholarship has argued 
that trademarks, like inventions and expressions, have characteristics of public goods.24  
From these characteristics flow the policy prescriptions that form the basis of intellectual 
property’s economic theory. 
¶20 Pure public goods are non-rivalrous in consumption and non-excludable in 
production.25  A classic definition of “non-rivalrous” appears in the leading exposition of 
 
23 The intellectual property literature is so rife with reference to public goods that it is difficult to collect 
them all, but for recent examples, see Alan Devlin, Indeterminism and the Property-Patent Equation, 28 
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 61, 96 (2009); Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the 
Utilitarian Foundations of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897, 952 (2009); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., 
Copyright, Private Copying, and Discrete Public Goods, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2009); 
Conley & Yoo, supra note 7; Ariel Simon, Reinventing Discovery: Patent Law’s Characterizations of and 
Interventions upon Science, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2175, 2182 (2009).  See also sources collected at David W. 
Barnes, One Trademark Per Source, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 12 n.55 (2009); Barnes, New 
Economics, supra note 15, at 23 n.2 (2006). 
24 See sources cited supra note 15. 
25 Professor Crimm explains: 
As a starting point, public or collective goods and services can be divided into two categories: 
pure public goods and services and impure, or mixed, public goods and services.  Both 
categories are characterized by features of availability to an indefinite class of beneficiaries, 
and of the inability to force the public to directly pay a sufficient price to induce the 
production in the private marketplace.  Pure public goods and services are characterized by 
non-rivalry—that is, “one person's consumption of the good does not interfere with its 
availability to others”—and by non-excludability—that is, no person can be excluded from 
consumption of the good or service even if unwilling to pay for it (a “free-rider”).   
Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A 
Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 440 (1998) (Internal citations omitted).  See also 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic 
Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 627 (2008) (“A resource is said to be non-rivalrous when its 
use by one person does not interfere with its use by another (or in other words, when such additional use 
entails no marginal cost) and non-excludable when it cannot easily be controlled in such a way as to 
exclude others from using it.”); Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions Are Not Enough: The 
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public goods theory by Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler26: a good is non-rivalrous 
“when a unit of the good can be consumed by one individual without detracting, in the 
slightest, from the consumption opportunities still available to others from that same 
unit.”27  A good is non-excludable if it is impossible, extremely difficult, or prohibitively 
expensive to prevent people from using the good once it is produced.28  Public finance 
economists formalized public goods theory.29  The context in which they derived the 
fundamental principles of public goods theory was quite different from the context of 
intellectual property.  The most obvious difference is that they were thinking about 
physical goods (i.e., highways, courts, lighthouses, national defense systems) rather than 
intangible information.  This allowed them to structure their rules around the optimal 
number of units of a public good to produce and draw analogies to the production of 
private goods.  It is hard to think in terms of units of information other than as measured 
by bits and bytes, which hardly capture the essence of information’s quality.  This is not a 
critical difference, however, because we can still think about the optimal amount of 
creative work, even if we cannot measure it like the optimal number of highway lanes. 
¶21 More important for our purposes, public finance economists were thinking about 
the collective provision of these physical goods, rather than the private creation of 
information.30  These goods might be produced by the government itself or by contractors 
hired or subsidized by the government; in either case, the government paid for the work.  
If the government was going to pay for the work, the theorists could focus on the optimal 
quantity of public goods, because the government would pay for whatever the optimal 
amount was.  From public goods theory, economists derived principles for determining 
how much of any good the government should provide.31    
¶22 While governments subsidize some creative work, western industrialized nations 
largely rely on independent economic actors to produce intellectual property.  Suppliers 
 
Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory Securities 
Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223, 344 n.246 (2002) (“A public good is characterized by two 
features: non-rivalrous consumption (i.e., consumption by one person does not generally preclude or 
exhaust the ability of others to consume the good) and allocative non-excludability (i.e., an inability to 
capture the economic benefits of supplying the good after it is produced).”).  
26 RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB 
GOODS (2d ed. 1996). 
27 Id. at 8. 
28 See ADAM GIFFORD, JR. & GARY J. SANTONI, PUBLIC ECONOMICS: POLITICIANS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
AND EXCHANGE 32 (1979) (“A characteristic of some public goods (and some private goods) is that, once 
the good is produced, it is extremely costly to prevent individuals from consuming the good.”).  See also 
CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 26, at 9 (stating that goods are non-excludable if “once they are provided, 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to exclude individuals from their benefits”). 
29 For an overview of public finance economics in general and public goods theory as it relates to public 
finance, a classic in the field of public finance is RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC 
FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (5th ed. 1989).   
30 See id. 
31 This work was first formalized by Professor Paul Samuelson in a famous trio of articles: Paul A. 
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954) [hereinafter 
Samuelson, Pure Theory]; Paul A. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public 
Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. & STAT. 350 (1955); Paul A. Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure 
Theories, 40 REV. ECON. & STAT. 332 (1958).  As the previous discussion suggests, it is not critical for 
public goods theory that the government is the producer.  The government may indeed produce the goods, 
but may alternatively pay someone else to do so.  The government “provides” rather than “produces.”  The 
key question is the quantity of public goods the government, rather than a market, determines should be 
provided. 
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of goods and services select and promote their own trademarks, authors devise and fix in 
tangible media their own ways of expressing ideas, and inventors create their own novel 
processes and compositions of matter.  To apply public goods theory to intellectual 
property law, public goods theory has to be turned on its head.  Rather than avoiding 
markets and figuring out the optimal level of government provision of public goods, the 
challenge is to correct market failures and let markets figure out the optimal output.   
¶23 This section first explores the meaning of non-rivalrousness in the intellectual 
property context, then turns to non-excludability. 
A. Non-Rivalrousness 
¶24 If intellectual property is a public good, then it is consumed differently from private 
goods.  One “unit” can be consumed simultaneously by many.  One person’s 
consumption does not diminish, in the slightest, the “consumption opportunities” still 
available to others from that unit.  It may be sensible for public finance economists to 
speak in terms of the “units” of physical goods that may be “consumed.”  The 
government may provide another mile of road, another police officer, or another library.  
A consumer drives down a piece of road, enjoys the protection of another police officer, 
or appreciates the convenience of another library.  It is odd to think of “units” of 
intellectual property or the “consumption opportunities” that the provision of intellectual 
property creates.   
¶25 The public good in intellectual property is information—the idea transformed by 
the creative process into something from which people may benefit.  The information 
may be about who supplied a good or the characteristics of a good, about how to express 
an idea, or about a novel composition of matter or way to produce goods.  The intangible 
information should not be confused with the physical manifestation of that information, 
because the physical manifestation is not a public good.  The physical manifestation of 
intellectual property information may be a book, a CD, or a machine.  These physical 
manifestations are easily seen as “units” but they do not have the characteristics of public 
goods.  A particular physical manifestation (i.e., book, CD, or machine) is not 
simultaneously available for many consumers and a person can keep others from 
enjoying it.  The physical manifestation is a private good.  By contrast, it is the 
information resulting from the creative process that is non-rivalrous and the essence of 
the intellectual property public good. 
¶26 We do not usually think of intellectual property information as creating 
“consumption opportunities.”  People may benefit from information, but we do not think 
of anyone “consuming” source-indicating symbols, ways of expressing ideas, or 
inventive concepts.  But people do benefit from information without “using it up.”  
Information is a pure public good, because, once produced, it can be used simultaneously 
by many individuals without detracting, in the slightest, from the benefits still available 
to others from that information.  It is the very characteristic of non-rivalrousness that 
makes us think that ideas are not consumed.  For this reason, in the intellectual property 
context, “consumption opportunities” refer to the benefits that users of the good obtain 
from the supply of the good.32   
 
32 Frischmann, Infrastructure, supra note 3, at 942 (“For economists, ‘consumption’ simply refers to the 
realization of benefits by virtue of one's access to the good.”). 
 104
Vol. 9:3] David W. Barnes 
¶27 Some scholars have rephrased the definition of non-rivalrousness in a way 
somewhat divorced from the technical public finance definition.  These alternatives are 
more amenable to application to intellectual property law.  Professor Balganesh, writing 
about the right to exclude others from intellectual property information,33 stated that non-
rivalrous means that “one person does not interfere with its use by another.”34  Focusing 
on the “use” of goods and one person’s use “interfering” with another’s use assists in the 
application of public goods theory to intellectual property.  A chair is a private good 
because one person using a chair interferes with another’s use of it; both cannot 
simultaneously benefit from it.  Two people with ordinary skill in the relevant art can, 
however, simultaneously use the information specified in a patent to build a machine.  
Neither interferes with the other and both can benefit from it.  The information is never 
“used up.”  The information can be shared by all non-rivalrously. 
¶28 Another person can benefit from a piece of information without imposing any costs 
on others.  In economic terms, information can be supplied to another person at zero 
marginal cost.35  Once Porsche or Hyundai uses a trademark in interstate commerce, 
many consumers would be able to refer to that mark when searching for, rejecting, or 
discussing their goods.  Once the song “Happy Birthday” has been created and published, 
many would be able to sing it simultaneously to celebrate their friends’ special occasions.  
Once the method for exchanging instant digital messages by cell phone has been 
revealed, many would be able to simultaneously exploit that information.36  People 
“would be able” to use the information without interfering with the benefits others obtain 
if the law allowed.37   
 
33 Balganesh, supra note 25. 
34 Id. at 627.   
35 Id. (“A resource is said to be non-rivalrous . . . when such additional use entails no marginal 
cost . . . .”). 
36 We did not need public goods theory to appreciate the peculiar nature of ideas.  Thomas Jefferson 
observed that, like the flame of one candle from which many people can light their own candles, “He who 
receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine.”  Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1790–1826, at 
180–81 (H.A. Washington ed., 1854) (quoted in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 8–
9 & n.2 (1966)).  At least to some extent, others may use the signaling power of a trademark, the ideas 
reflected in a tangible expression, and the information embodied in a patent without diminishing the utility 
others derive from that information. 
Nor did we need public goods theory to appreciate that the free access principle flows from the non-
rivalrous characteristic.  Thomas Jefferson stated: 
That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual 
instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and 
benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, 
without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and 
have our physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation.  
Graham, 383 U.S. at 8 n.2.  The first part of this quote anticipates the non-rivalrous characteristics—
“expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any point”—as well as the free access 
principle—“ideas should freely spread.” 
37 These examples are particularly powerful illustrations of the idea that use by more than one person 
does not detract from the use by others.  It is apparent that as more people simultaneously use each of these 
examples of information, the benefit to each increases.  These “network effects” arise from shared 
knowledge of shopping opportunities, cultural practices, and a web of communication options.  Regarding 
network effects generally, see Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network 
Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998). 
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¶29 Simultaneous use of intellectual property information is never rivalrous in the sense 
that private goods are rivalrous.  Simultaneous use by one person does not eliminate the 
utility of the information to another, as one bite of an apple can benefit only one person.  
Even if used by many, the intellectual property information is usually still useful, often 
equally useful, regardless of the number of simultaneous consumers.  The way 
information is expressed in a John Phillip Sousa marching song is still as stirring.  The 
information about how to design a device that conveys messages wirelessly through the 
air is still as functional.  Many people can simultaneously rely on the information 
conveyed by the NIKE symbol when searching for footwear without diminishing the 
utility of that symbol as a source indicator. 
¶30 The non-rivalrous character of information gives rise to the first normative 
principle of intellectual property: the price people ought to pay for information should be 
equal to the cost they impose on others by their use.  Because use of information is non-
rivalrous, that cost is zero.  So, the price ought to be zero.38  This is the free access norm 
in intellectual property—all people should have the right freely to use information about 
inventions, ways of expressing ideas, and source-indicating symbols.  It appears to be 
closely related to the principal found in the theory of exchange of private property that 
resources are allocated efficiently when price equals marginal cost.  Part III will show 
why the price equals marginal cost principle is bootless and why the free access norm is 
an impractical and ultimately undesirable aspiration. 
B.  Non-Excludability 
¶31 As applied to intellectual property, non-excludability refers to the impossibility, 
extreme difficulty, or infeasibility of excluding people from freely enjoying the benefits 
of the supply of information.39  Once a trademark is used in commerce or a song or 
method of manufacture is disclosed to the public, how is a creator of such intellectual 
property to keep consumers from using it without paying?  Information is non-
excludable, because once the information has been disclosed, it is a challenge to prevent 
people who have not paid for the information from exploiting it.  If creators cannot get 
paid, they may lack sufficient incentives to create. 
¶32 Opposing the free-access norm derived from the non-rivalrous characteristic is the 
exclusive rights norm: producers should be able to exclude people from using the 
intellectual property information they have created.40  Methods of exclusion were not 
strictly necessary for public finance applications of public goods theory, because the 
government can force people to pay taxes to support production of public goods.41  The 
 
38 MUSGRAVE, supra note 29, at 43 (“Exclusion is inappropriate in the case of social goods because their 
consumption is nonrival . . . .  Efficient resource use requires that price equal marginal cost, but in this case 
marginal cost (the cost of admitting an additional user) is zero, and so should be the price.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
39 See supra note 28. 
40 MUSGRAVE, supra note 29, at 42 (“The market can function only in a situation where the ‘exclusion 
principle’ applies, i.e., where A’s consumption is made contingent on A’s paying the price, while B, who 
does not pay, is excluded.  Exchange cannot occur without property rights, and property rights require 
exclusion.”). 
41 Id. at 8. 
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government can rely on people’s expressions of preferences through the electoral process 
to determine how much demand there is for the goods.42   
¶33 If producers are obliged to seek returns through a market, however, they must be 
able to exclude people who do not pay.  If producers cannot exclude, consumers lack an 
economic reason to pay; they can acquire the good without paying.43  If producers cannot 
exclude, they cannot find out how much demand exists for their goods.44  The exclusive 
rights norm says that people should be restricted in their right freely to use intellectual 
property information in order to provide incentives for production and information about 
how much to produce.  Reconciling freedom and restrictions is the policy challenge 
presented and addressed by the use of public goods theory in intellectual property law.45  
¶34 Some scholars object to including non-excludability as a characteristic of public 
goods.46  The most compelling reason is that goods that are typically thought of and 
treated as private goods may share the characteristic of non-excludability.  If we think of 
non-excludability as extreme difficulty in exclusion or exclusion that is too costly relative 
to the benefits,47 it is not hard to think of examples.  My ranch in New Mexico is large 
enough that it is difficult to detect when someone is trespassing or to keep them out, but 
real property is typically treated as a private good.  It is a trespass to interfere with right 
to exclusive possession.  When I was in law school, I found no economically feasible 
technology that would keep people from helping themselves to the battery and wheels of 
my car, even when it was parked underneath my apartment in Philadelphia.  My car 
components are private goods, protected by the law of trespass to chattels.  As with 
public goods, it is very difficult to exclude others from using these private goods.  
¶35 The difficulty of exclusion for both public and private goods depends on available 
technology and institutional structures.  The law of trespass to land or chattels aids in 
 
42 Id. at 8, 48. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Peter Drahos, The Regulation of Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 321, 322 (2004) (“Intellectual 
property rights are essentially means of permitting exclusive use to knowledge in order to encourage its 
further development.”). 
46 Harold Demsetz, for instance, identifies public goods as those for which “it is possible at no cost for 
additional persons to enjoy the same unit” and distinguishes the “collective good, which imposes the 
stronger condition that it is impossible to exclude nonpurchasers from consuming the good.”  Harold 
Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 295 (1970).  David Brennan 
explains:  
[W]hether the attribute of non-excludability is necessary for a good to be classified as a 
“public good” has been a matter of controversy in economics.  Terminology arose which 
categorized undepletable non-excludable goods as a “pure public good,” goods which were 
[either] undepletable or non-excludable as “mixed goods,” and depletable, excludable goods 
as private goods.  Increasing acceptance, however, has been given to the proposition that a 
good only requires the attribute of undepletability to be categorized as a public good.  As 
such, public goods are today usually categorized (although the “pure public goods”/“mixed 
goods” terminology remains in use) as either excludable or non-excludable. 
David J. Brennan, Fair Price and Public Goods: A Theory of Value Applied to Retransmission, 22 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 347, 350 (2002) (citations omitted). 
47 See GIFFORD & SANTONI, supra note 28, at 32 (“A characteristic of some public goods (and some 
private goods) is that, once the good is produced, it is extremely costly to prevent individuals from 
consuming the good.”); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative 
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13 n.23 (1998) (interpreting non-excludability as meaning infeasibility of 
excluding others from enjoying a good) (citing MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: 
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 14 n.21 (1965)). 
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enforcing exclusive rights to real or personal property.  The law of trademark, copyright, 
or patent infringement aids in enforcing the exclusive rights to information.  These legal 
institutions supplement technical devices, such as fences, keys, and digital rights 
management, as mechanisms for excluding others.  It may be more expensive to employ 
some technologies or to enforce some rights than others, but this is as true for private as 
well as for public goods.   
¶36 This similarity between public and private goods cannot be sufficient reason to 
include non-rivalry but exclude non-excludability from the definition of a public good.  
Some private goods are non-rivalrous to some extent and some public goods are rivalrous 
to some extent.  While my car’s battery is strictly rivalrous, a fair number of horse riders 
can simultaneously use my New Mexico ranch without interfering with each other’s use.  
Highways and courts, classic examples of public goods in both the public finance 
literature and legal literature,48 can become overcrowded, which slows down traffic, 
limits access, generally interferes with other’s use, and decreases the benefits others 
derive from simultaneous consumption.  If non-excludability is out, then non-rivalry is 
out and there is nothing left.  
¶37 Another objection to non-excludability is strategic, or perhaps political.  Professor 
Brett Frischmann’s concern is that identifying non-excludability as a characteristic 
diverts attention from the potential benefits resulting from non-rivalrousness.49  He 
concludes that focusing on non-excludability causes analysts to turn their focus from non-
rivalrousness to preventing free-riding by designing market mechanisms that exclude 
people and reveal people’s demand for public goods.50  This means that those analysts 
will ignore the free access norm and end up with over-restrictive policy prescriptions that 
define the scope, strength, and duration of exclusive intellectual property rights too 
broadly and undesirably limit access.   
¶38 Fear of exclusively focusing on the problems of exclusion is no idle concern.  The 
second principle from exchange theory is that if public goods are excludable, private 
markets can theoretically efficiently allocate resources to their production.  A number of 
scholars focus exclusively on excludability problems, as if solving those problems would 
result in optimal incentives for production of intellectual property.51  Failing to account 
for non-rivalrousness ignores the access part of the incentives/access tradeoff. 
¶39 Either public goods theory is at fault or analysts are at fault.  If non-excludability is 
not part of public goods theory, then the failure to consider the incentive problems 
associated with non-excludability is a serious but understandable theoretical defect.  It is 
understandable, because public finance theorists did not have to be concerned with who 
would pay for the provision of public goods—taxpayers paid for public goods.  If an 
analyst fails to consider the implications of non-rivalry, then the failure is with the 
 
48 See, e.g., MUSGRAVE, supra note 29, at 54 (discussing highway congestion); Rex E. Lee, The 
American Courts as Public Goods: Who Should Pay the Costs of Litigation?, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 267 
(1985) (discussing the non-rivalry and non-excludability characteristics of some outputs of courts); Tracey 
E. George & Chris Guthrie, Induced Litigation, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 545 (2004) (applying the public goods 
model of highway congestion to the courts and treating both as impure public goods). 
49 Frischmann, Infrastructure, supra note 3, at 948–49 (“Critically, focusing on free-riding and market-
driven supply obscures the economic meaning and importance of non-rivalry.”). 
50 Id. 
51 See, e.g., Richard Adelstein, Equity and Efficiency in Markets for Ideas, 17 CONN. J. INT’L L. 249 
(2002). 
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analyst.  We could either conclude that public goods theory itself is bootless, or we could 
conclude that some analysts fail to see the big picture.  Either way, if financial incentives 
are necessary for the creation of intellectual property information, the implications of 
non-excludability must be included.  Frischmann does recognize that while finding ways 
to make goods excludable will not reconcile the access/exclusive right norms, 
excludability can increase incentives and help make markets for public goods function 
more efficiently.52 
¶40 Finally, there is a reason to believe that non-excludability was, from the beginning, 
a concern of public goods theorists.  Professor Samuelson, in his original formulation of 
the conditions necessary for optimal provision of public goods, wrote of the 
“impossibility of a decentralized spontaneous solution” to the question of how much of a 
public good the government should provide.53  He was referring to the inability of a 
competitive market to determine the amount of consumption of public goods for which 
people are willing and able to pay.  People conceal their preferences, because they can 
“hope to snatch some selfish benefit” from the fact that, once produced, public goods are 
freely available for all, regardless of whether they pay or not.54  Samuelson’s view was 
that the government would solve this demand revelation problem through voting or other 
signaling methods.55  The “impossibility of a decentralized spontaneous solution” comes 
from the non-excludability characteristic.  People do not reveal their preferences for 
public goods, because they cannot be excluded.  Regardless of whether non-rivalrousness 
and non-excludability should be part of the characterization of a public good, both are 
essential to the analysis of the incentives/access tradeoff. 
III. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS FROM PUBLIC GOODS THEORY 
A. Markets for Intellectual Property 
¶41 The normative implications of characterizing intellectual property as a pure public 
good are well known.  Because pure public goods are non-rivalrous once produced, 
people should have access to them at no cost.  Because pure public goods are non-
excludable, however, people have no incentive to reveal their demand for public goods or 
to reward suppliers for producing them.  Because pure public goods are costly to produce, 
suppliers must have some way of paying for the costs of production.  Free access and 
incentives to invest in creative activity are in tension.   
¶42 The government could take responsibility for providing public goods: rely on 
voting and lobbying to reveal how much people want them, collect taxes to pay for their 
production, and give them to people at no additional cost.  Public goods theory also 
suggests that, instead of directly producing goods, governments could subsidize private 
production of public goods out of tax revenues and determine how much people want 
through the political process.  In either of these options, it does not matter who actually 
 
52 Id. at 949 (quoting CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 26, at 56–57). 
53 Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, in PUBLIC GOODS & MARKET FAILURES: 
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 31 (Tyler Cowen ed. 1999) [hereinafter Samuelson, Pure Theory in Cowen]. 
54 Id. at 33.  See also CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 26, at 24 (“The non-excludability property of pure 
public goods induces individuals to undercontribute to provision in the belief that they can rely on the 
contributions of others.”). 
55 Samuelson, Pure Theory in Cowen, supra note 53, at 32.  
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produces the public goods.  The important feature is that the government figures out the 
optimal amount to supply and collects taxes to pay the suppliers.  If—and this is a big 
if—governments could accurately determine the demand for public goods through voting, 
they could efficiently allocate resources to the supply of public goods.   
¶43 Alternatively, governments could create exclusive legal rights to intellectual 
property and permit the exchange of those rights.  Trademark, copyright, and patent laws 
theoretically enable markets to ensure widespread access to creations, reveal people’s 
demand for them, and compensate creators.  Because private markets cannot 
simultaneously provide free access and charge for access to public goods, private markets 
cannot simultaneous satisfy the free access and exclusive rights norms, nor can they 
efficiently allocate resources to the creation of information. 
¶44 Intellectual property law defines the scope, strength, and duration of exclusive 
rights.  If rights are narrow, either fewer consumers pay or consumers pay less to use 
intellectual property information.  There is more access and less external financial 
incentive to create.  If rights are broad, there is less access and more potential for 
financial incentive.  By recognizing exclusive rights, intellectual property law addresses 
the non-excludability problem.  Authors are entitled to protect their creative expressions 
of ideas.  Copyright law protects the original, creative aspects of an expression.56  
Trademark law distinguishes among users.  Trademark law excludes confusing 
proprietary use57 but permits free fair competitive descriptive use and referential use.58  
Patent law limits duration by creating exclusive rights for twenty years.59  Limits on the 
exclusive rights defined by intellectual property law affect how much producers earn, and 
therefore, their incentives to create.   
¶45 The law provides an institutional structure (most generally, infringement actions) 
that creators of valuable information can use to exclude or force payment.  Intellectual 
property law does not ensure that any particular creative work receives sufficient reward 
to provide an incentive to produce.  The question of how much any particular producer 
gets paid is left to the market.  Producers get paid what people think the information or 
the physical embodiment of that information—such as a good with trademark affixed, a 
copyrighted sculpture, or a patented machine—is worth.  Once the law identifies the 
goods for which  people must pay, who must pay, and for how long they must pay, 
markets do their work.  By offering to sell their goods at various prices, producers can 
test people’s willingness and ability to pay, and decide accordingly how much to 
produce.  Intellectual property law creates an incentive for private persons to supply 
public goods by providing an opportunity to earn a profit. 
 
56 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“The sine qua non of copyright 
is originality.  To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author.  Original, as the 
term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to 
copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”) (citation 
omitted). 
57 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2006) (prohibiting registration of marks likely to cause confusion); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a) (creating a private cause of action of another’s use of a mark that is likely to confuse consumers).   
58 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (stating that a supplier’s use of another’s mark is permitted if it is a use 
“otherwise than as a mark, . . . of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith 
only to describe the goods or services of such party”).  
59 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (limiting patent term to 20 years from the date on which the patent was filed in 
the United States). 
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B. IP’s Bootless Principles 
1. Price Equals Marginal Cost 
¶46 A properly functioning market for intellectual property is one that reaches a proper 
balance between access and incentives.  Economic theory explains how competitive 
markets efficiently allocate resources to the production of private goods by referring to 
the normative desirability of having prices equal to marginal costs.60  Marginal cost is the 
additional (marginal) cost of supplying another unit of a good.61  A price equal to 
marginal cost is desirable, because it reflects the social costs of supplying that additional 
consumer.62  As a normative matter, classical economic theory concludes that if the 
additional consumer derives any benefit from the good, the additional consumer ought to 
be given access to the good at the additional cost of supplying the good.63  This may be 
an adequate normative foundation for competitive markets for private goods, where 
marginal cost pricing is profitable, but not for public goods. 
¶47 The marginal costs of supplying another consumer are generally positive for private 
goods.  Marginal costs are generally positive, because sharing a unit of the good that has 
already been provided is not feasible, as it is for a non-rivalrous public good.  Another 
unit must be produced.  In a properly functioning, perfectly competitive market, those 
positive prices cover producers' costs of production.64  The sum of the marginal costs for 
all consumers and the fixed costs (costs that do not vary with the amount produced)65 
equals the total costs of production.66  The costs of supplying each consumer with his or 
her own private goods mount up because consumption is rivalrous; each person consumes 
individually.   
¶48 The difficulty in achieving an efficient market allocation of resources to the 
creation of intellectual property information arises from the formulation of the first 
bootless principal: 
BP#1: From exchange theory: 
 
60 JACK HIRSCHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 481, 479–81 (3d ed. 1984).  In markets for 
private goods, a price equal to the marginal cost of supplying the good efficiently allocates resources to 
production of that good.  Such a price results in a proper incentive to a supplier of goods, because that price 
allows the supplier to cover its costs including a normal economic profit.  Such a price also results in a 
proper level of supply as measured by a benefit/cost analysis.  The benefit a buyer obtains from acquiring 
the good is measured by the buyers’ willingness and ability to pay for the good.  The cost in the balance is 
the cost of the resources consumed by the supplier providing the good.  The normative parts of this 
explanation are the assertion that revenues sufficient to cover costs provide a “proper” incentive and that 
the resulting level of supply of the good is the “proper” level.  All of the economics of competitive markets 
for private goods is based on the price equals marginal cost equality and the assumptions about the 
desirability of allocative efficiency.  The challenges to those assumptions are well known, but not worth 
repeating here. 
61 JAMES F. RAGAN, JR. & LLOYD B. THOMAS, JR., PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 522 (1990).  
62 Id. at 565. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 548–58. 
65 Id. at 520. 
66 Id. at 548–58.  Because marginal costs are the additional costs of producing each unit, starting with 
the first, the additional costs of producing the first and all subsequent units plus the fixed costs incurred to 
start up in the first place equals the total costs. 
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Resources are allocated efficiently when price equals marginal cost. 67 
The private goods intuition behind this principle lies in the tradeoff between the cost of 
making goods and the benefits obtained from consuming goods.  Society is concerned 
with both the value of the resources sacrificed to produce goods and the value of the 
resulting goods to the consumer compared to other goods he or she might have 
consumed.  The rate at which additional resources are used up to produce another unit of 
the good is referred to as the “marginal rate of transformation” (“MRT”).68  The MRT 
measures the rate of sacrifice of resources in production of another unit of the good, 
while the “marginal cost” in BP#1 is the dollar value of those resources sacrificed.  When 
buying an additional unit of one good, consumers also give up an opportunity to purchase 
other goods.  The rate at which consumers are willing and able to give up other goods to 
obtain another unit of a particular good is referred to as the “marginal rate of 
substitution” (“MRS”).69  The MRS depends on the opportunity cost of buying another 
unit expressed in terms of the other goods sacrificed, while “price” in BP#1 is expressed 
in terms of the dollar value of those opportunities.  The dollar value of those 
opportunities reflects the benefits the consumer expects from the purchase of an 
additional unit.   
¶49 The price equals marginal cost rule reflects a wealth maximizing perspective on the 
tradeoff.  If the value of resources given up is less than the value of the benefits gained, it 
is worthwhile to invest the resources to produce the benefits.  For private goods, 
resources are allocated efficiently if MRS equals MRT for all consumers.70  As long as 
the marginal cost of producing another unit of a private good is less than the benefit an 
individual would obtain from that unit, it is efficient to produce that unit. 
¶50 Two related desirable features arise from market prices that are equal to marginal 
costs.  The first is a distributional concern.  Marginal cost is the additional (marginal) 
cost of supplying another unit of a good.71  A price equal to marginal cost is desirable 
because it reflects the social costs of supplying that additional consumer.72  As a 
normative matter, classical economic theory concludes that if the additional consumer is 
willing and able to pay a price equal to the resources sacrificed to supply a unit of the 
good to him, the additional consumer ought to be provided with that unit of the good.73  
That is an appealing rule because the resources used to provide the good are being 
reallocated from a less valuable use (e.g. iron ore lying in the ground or devoted to 
another use, an artist lying in his bed or doing something other than creative work) to a 
more valuable use (e.g. the frame of a car, an expression of ideal beauty in a sculpture).74  
 
67 The proof of this assertion has been thoroughly discussed by others in both the economics and legal 
literature.  See, e.g., Conley & Yoo, supra note 7, at 1808–09 (describing optimality conditions for 
production of private and public goods).  
68 HIRSCHLEIFER, supra note 60, at 411. 
69 PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 88 (15th ed. 1995) [hereinafter 
SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS]. 
70 CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 26, at 22–3. 
71 RAGAN & THOMAS, supra note 61, at 522. 
72 Id. at 565. 
73 Id. 
74 See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS, supra note 69, at 136 (“Allocative efficiency (or 
efficiency) occurs when no possible reorganization of production can make anyone better off without 
making someone else worse off.”). 
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Resources are efficiently allocated by exchanges from people who place a lower value on 
the goods to people who place a higher value on the goods.75   
¶51 Second, pricing at marginal cost can create desirable incentives.  In perfectly 
competitive markets in equilibrium, suppliers of goods choose an output level where the 
marginal cost of supplying another unit of the good equals the average cost of supplying 
that unit.76  Pricing at marginal cost and producing at that level is profitable enough to 
encourage that supplier to stay in business.77  Unfortunately, neither of these 
characteristics applies to intellectual property public goods.   
¶52 Because intellectual property law is concerned with determining the optimal degree 
of access and exclusion, a number of translations from the private market context are 
necessary.  Neither of those desirable benefits associated with the price equals marginal 
cost rule can be realized in a market for intellectual property.  First, if policymakers 
followed the price equals marginal cost rule, intellectual property law would be very 
straightforward, because a price equal to zero would mean free access for everyone.  A 
price equal to marginal cost does not, however, reflect the social costs of supplying a 
good everyone can share non-rivalrously.  The marginal cost of making information 
available to another consumer is zero, once the information has been produced.  Most 
analysts just slide over that “once the information has been produced” qualification, but it 
is critical.  Second, creators cannot produce information at a level where marginal cost 
equals average cost and hope that supplying that level of output will be profitable.  The 
marginal costs of supplying a public good to another customer are zero, but the average 
costs will never be zero if it costs anything to produce the information.  If creators need 
an external incentive, it will not be supplied by the zero revenues they would obtain 
under the price equals marginal cost principle.  Creators of intellectual property, like 
producers of other goods,78 must be able to cover all of their costs in order to encourage 
them to produce information. 
¶53 The price equals marginal cost principle is useful without supplying a guiding rule.  
It identifies the interest in permitting access to as many as are willing to pay (some 
measure of) the costs of making access available to them.  It also identifies the interest in 
ensuring returns that encourage an (identified) amount of creative activity.  It does not, 
however, provide a rule upon which analysts can rely in deciding questions of scope, 
strength, and duration of intellectual property rights. 
2. Marginal Cost and Summed Marginal Benefits 
¶54 Public finance theory attempts to fill the gap resulting from the inapplicability of 
the price equals marginal cost rule with another principle, also bootless, that describes the 
optimal amount of a particular public good the government should provide: 
BP #2: From public goods theory: 
 
75 See HIRSCHLEIFER, supra note 60, at 218. 
76 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS, supra note 69, at 129–131. 
77 See EDWIN MANSFIELD, ECONOMICS 546–47 (5th ed. 1986); HIRSCHLEIFER, supra note 60, at 253 
(defining normal economic profit as the amount necessary to attract and retain the resources employed in 
the industry). 
78 MANSFIELD, supra note 78, at 737–38; STANLEY FISCHER, RUDIGER DORNBUSCH & RICHARD 
SCHMALENSEE, INTRODUCTION TO MICROECONOMICS 168 (1988). 
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Increasing amounts of public goods should be produced until the marginal rate of 
transformation equals the sum of the marginal rates of substitution. 
This principle of public goods theory is similar to the private optimum approach in that it 
describes the optimum level of production of goods.  For public goods, consumers benefit 
equally from the provision of a good, even if they share.  So, the total benefits to all 
consumers, as measured by the summed marginal rates of substitution, should be equated 
with the marginal rate of transformation, ∑MRS = MRT.79  This means that as long as the 
marginal cost of producing another unit of a public good is less than the benefits all 
members of society non-rivalrously sharing that unit would obtain from that unit, it is 
efficient to produce that unit.  This equality reflects the focus of public finance 
economists concerned with the size of highways, the number of police on the street, and 
the number of lighthouses. 
¶55 The focus of intellectual property scholars is quite different.  The incentives/access 
tradeoff is concerned with two different values.  The incentives side of the balance is 
concerned with the value of additional information that results from any increase in 
incentives that accompanies broader exclusive rights to a particular type of information.  
The access side of the balance is concerned with the value of the benefits society obtains 
from free access to that type of information.  BP#2 answers the question: “How many 
resources should be devoted to the production of information?”  By contrast, the 
challenge for intellectual property scholars is figuring out how to establish rights that 
guide a market to produce that optimal amount.   
¶56 BP#2 provides only some of the information relevant to determining the optimal 
scope of intellectual property protection.  The marginal rate of substitution reflects the 
rate at which all consumers benefit from the information.  The “price” term in BP#1 
reflects the willingness and ability of people to pay for goods, and hence the benefits they 
would obtain from access to the goods.  A similar summation of the benefits that people 
would obtain from access to the information reflects a collective willingness and ability 
to pay for public goods.  If that number were discoverable by private suppliers of 
information, we would have a beginning, at least, to the question: “How much 
information should be produced?” 
¶57 The marginal rate of transformation does not, however, reflect the effect of 
exclusive rights on incentives, and it does not answer the question: “What is the value of 
information that will result from broader exclusive rights?”  To answer that question, 
policy makers would need to know more than the value of the resources consumed during 
the creative process.  Among other things, policy makers need to know what means exist, 
other than granting exclusive rights, to encourage creative activity, and how creators 
 
79 CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 26, at 23.  The benefits a person derives from production of another 
unit is measured by the additional resources he or she would be willing to give up to consume the good.  In 
economics, this is the marginal rate of substitution, MRS, between the resources the person would give up 
and the good in question.  Because of non-rivalry, the total benefit from an additional unit of a public good 
is the sum of everyone's MRS, that is, ΣMRSi for all i consumers.  The optimum is reached where ΣMRSi = 
MC, the marginal cost of production.  Thus, the demand for a public good is determined by summing the 
benefits each person derives from the provision of a single unit of the good.   
For private goods, the optimum is reached where MRSi, the marginal rate of substitution for a single 
individual, equals the marginal cost, MRSi = MC.  Thus, the demand for a private good is determined by 
summing the number of units demanded by consumers at a particular price.  
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respond to these alternative incentives.  It is futile to attempt to answer these questions by 
reference to either of the first two principles. 
¶58 In addition to its general irrelevance to the questions intellectual property policy 
makers need answered, achieving the optimum dictated by BP#2 requires a critical bit of 
information: How much benefit does each consumer get from the provision of a public 
good?  Initially, this was not a problem for public finance economists because voting and 
the political process revealed consumer demand for collectively provided goods and 
services.80  Economists eventually began to doubt the accuracy of those revelations and 
explore more efficient voting mechanisms.81  However, the problem for intellectual 
property is not voting but how to get markets to reveal the demand for public goods.  
Achieving the optimum dictated by BP#2 also requires a precise institutional structure—a 
legal framework that creates a market that will reveal people’s demand for a non-
excludable good that people have no interest in revealing.  BP#2 helps with neither of 
these issues.  While of critical importance to the centralized provision of public goods, it 
is of no direct assistance when designing decentralized, market supply of public goods. 
3. Efficient Markets for Excludable Public Goods 
¶59 As fortune would have it, a principle from exchange theory steps up to address this 
dilemma: 
BP #3: From exchange theory: 
If public goods were excludable, private markets could efficiently allocate 
resources to their production. 
Intellectual property economists agree that BP#3 is theoretically correct.82  This principle 
holds true if creators are able successfully to engage in perfect price discrimination.  This 
 
80 See supra note 55. 
81 Public choice economics is the field devoted to the political economics and institutional dynamics.  
See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 47.  Professor Kang explains:  
[P]ublic choice theory suggests little hope that direct democracy, however configured, can 
identify and fulfill the public's most preferred policies.  Voting paradoxes render elusive the 
identification of the mass public's most preferred policy even within a single policy domain, 
let alone identification of priorities across policy domains.  Preference cycles, strategic 
voting, and the bias of agenda setting plague these determinations though the procedures of 
voting.  As a consequence, voting in direct democracy may embody, at best, a “negative 
ideal” without any assurance, perhaps without much possibility, of producing “a clear, 
consistent, meaningful statement of the popular will.”  
Michael S. Kang, Voting as Veto, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1221, 1277 (2010) (citations omitted). 
82 Professor Lunney explains:  
The literature also establishes that we can achieve a Pareto efficient outcome in the 
production of the public good by enabling perfect price discrimination with respect to the 
public good.  In this context, perfect price discrimination creates personalized markets for the 
public good, where each consumer's consumption of the public good becomes a distinct 
commodity with its own market and its own price. If it could be achieved, the resulting 
equilibrium, known as a Lindahl equilibrium, would essentially convert the public good into a 
private good and ensure a Pareto efficient outcome. 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright’s Price Discrimination Panacea, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 387, 451–52 
(2008).  
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means that creators are able to charge each buyer the maximum that each buyer is willing 
and able to pay for the goods provided and exclude those who do not.83    
¶60 The requirement of excludability is met by making intellectual property rights 
robust and strong.  Taken to an extreme, no one would have the right to derive any 
benefit from anyone else’s creative work without permission from the creator.  While the 
first principle (price equals marginal cost) would mean that everything was fair use if the 
marginal cost were zero, the third principle means that no beneficial use would be fair.   
¶61 An efficient market for excludable public goods would not look familiar from the 
theoretical perspective.  There would be no matching of the cost of production with the 
price, as the price equals marginal cost principle suggests.  Instead, prices are matched 
with people’s willingness and ability to pay.84  
¶62 It is evident that creators of all forms of intellectual property are sometimes able to 
price discriminate in their licensing practices.  Copyright owners can negotiate different 
fees from different advertisers, for instance, who will obtain different amounts of benefit 
from their use of copyrighted music in their marketing.  Patent holders can negotiate 
different royalty arrangements from different manufacturers, for instance, who wish to 
produce their novel and original inventions or employ them in their production processes.  
Trademark owners can charge licensees different fees according to the sales revenues that 
the licensees can expect to earn.  BP#3 recommends these practices as a way of ensuring 
efficient allocation of resources to creative activity. 
¶63 Normally, however, information is not sold on a discriminatory basis.  In printed 
form, information is customarily provided at a fixed price to all newspaper, periodical, 
and book readers; radio and TV listeners; and Internet surfers.  Buyers of information 
embodied in physical products also usually pay the same price.  The buyer of a 
trademarked good may pay a higher price that covers the marketing and promotion of the 
source and product information contained in a trademark, but all buyers generally pay the 
same price for each unit.  Some who benefit from the trademark information—such as, 
consumers who make a point not to buy a particular brand—do not pay at all.  Everyone 
pays the same price for downloading a particular piece of copyrighted music from a 
particular web site, but some who benefit from the music or art or literature by listening 
to it, viewing it, or reading it do not pay at all.  Even commercial users often have blanket 
 
83 See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 19, at 656–57; Lunney, supra note 82, at 396, 451; F. Scott Kieff, 
Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects 
and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 422–23 (2006) [hereinafter Kieff, Coordination]; F. Scott 
Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 727 
(2001) [hereinafter Kieff, Property Rights]. 
84 Scholars have considered the efficiency effects of various several price discrimination rules.  The 
oldest price discrimination scheme applicable to public goods is Lindahl pricing, under which each 
consumer is charged a price tailored to match the marginal benefit they get from using the final unit of the 
good purchased.  See Lindahl, supra note 21, at 168–76.  No one is excluded simply by virtue of the fact 
that they are willing and able to pay very little, so there is as much access as under the free access norm.  
And, the seller would adjust to the total of these prices to produce a matching level of output, thereby 
ensuring a profit.  An alternative is Ramsey pricing, in which consumers who are very sensitive to price (in 
that they will adjust the quantity of the good they demand in response to price changes more dramatically, 
highly elastic demand) pay a higher portion of fixed costs and consumers who are less sensitive (those with 
inelastic demand) pay lower prices.  Ramsey, supra note 21, at 58–59.  The difficulty with pricing 
according to marginal cost when goods are non-rivalrous is that fixed costs of production are never covered 
by a zero price, but pricing above zero potentially excludes some consumers who would benefit from 
access to the good.  Allocating fixed costs according to the elasticity of consumer demand minimizes the 
losses associated with charging a positive price and ensures a profit.  Id. 
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licenses that give them unlimited rights to use an entire collection of copyrighted works.  
Everyone who buys an iPad containing the latest patented digital technology pays the 
same price.  When embodied in goods, whether patented, copyrighted, or trademarked, 
the price obtained from each user is generally the same—or at least not generally 
dependent on the buyer’s marginal valuation. 
¶64 The excludability requirement presents problems as well.  Even robust intellectual 
property rights fail to make creative works excludable.  The problems in enforcing 
exclusive rights to copyrighted works have given rise to the agencies that sell the blanket 
rights.  There is no way to collect from people, who use trademarks to refer to and reject 
goods of a particular brand.  Discussing copyright and patent law, Professors Lemley and 
Frischmann85 point out that the number of people benefitting from one person’s creative 
work extends far beyond those in a position to negotiate with the creator.86  Neither of the 
negotiating parties, such as an inventor and seller or the author and publisher, may be in a 
position to foresee the benefits that will flow from their arrangements to the ultimate 
users of the patented or copyrighted work.87  Nor could a creator internalize the benefits 
of creative works inspired by his or her work.88  Even if intellectual property rights were 
absolute—permitting no free access or fair use—the market could not efficiently allocate 
resources, because perfect excludability of information is impossible.  Even if it were 
possible, perfect excludability without price discrimination would not lead to an efficient 
solution.89  
¶65 There are political and practical problems with the price discrimination solutions.  
The political problem is that the norm in markets for private goods is for everyone to pay 
the same price—namely, the one that reflects the costs of production.  Price 
discrimination would mean that you might have to pay more for your iPod, music 
downloads, and video games than your friends, even at the same store and even if the 
 
85 Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007). 
86 Frischmann and Lemley offer the example of the inventor of the computer spreadsheet who obtains 
his compensation from the buyers of the software.  Id. at 258.  Those buyers obtain benefits by using the 
software, only some of which they pass on to the inventor.  Consumers benefit from using the software 
when they pay less for the goods and services produced by people who save money by using computer 
spreadsheets, but these savings are only indirectly and partially internalized to the inventor, if at all.   
87 Frischmann and Lemley offer the example of Alexander Graham Bell, id. at 260, who could not have 
foreseen and internalized the benefits from expanded modern communications systems inspired by the 
invention of the telephone. 
88 Id. at 261 (observing that an inventor in one field may have no awareness of the benefits from his or 
her work in other fields). 
89 Professor Lunney has emphasized that it is the non-rivalrous character of public goods that creates the 
market failure, as follows: 
In terms of economic analysis, . . . [the] suggestion that addressing the issue of excludability 
is alone sufficient to ensure an efficient market for copyrighted works is simply wrong.  Even 
if copyright law enabled a copyright owner to exclude non-payers perfectly, the ability to 
exclude would not establish the efficiency of the resulting markets.  So long as consumption 
of works of authorship remains non-rivalrous—that is, so long as “one man’s consumption 
does not reduce some other man’s consumption,” the first fundamental theorem of welfare 
economics does not apply.  As a result, even if the assumptions necessary for the theorem’s 
application are otherwise satisfied, a competitive equilibrium through private markets will not 
generally achieve a Pareto optimal allocation of copyrighted works or the resources necessary 
to create them. 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 994 (2002) 
(quoting Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 31, at 387). 
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sales were online.90  Consumers are becoming more accustomed to paying a different 
price from another person when purchasing a car, flying in an airplane, or staying in a 
hotel; however, many think there is something unsavory about that fact.  It would also 
mean that sellers would need to know each consumer’s willingness and ability to pay for 
the marginal item, which means they would have to know each consumer’s preferences 
and budget.  Aside from buyers’ natural incentive to strategically conceal this 
information,91 people might consider this a bit invasive of their privacy.92  The efficiency 
and other normative bases for and against price discrimination have been examined in 
detail in the scholarly literature.93 
¶66 These price discrimination proposals are useful, because they indicate benefits 
flowing from the law’s facilitation of price discrimination,94 but they are ultimately 
unhelpful because of their practical difficulties.  Price discrimination schemes require 
private suppliers of goods to acquire a great deal of information about individual 
consumers—such as, the marginal benefits they derive from the last unit of a good 
provided to them or their demand sensitivity.  Professor Yoo concludes that “there is no 
practical, real-world, incentive-compatible way to induce consumers to use prices to 
signal the intensity of their preferences.”95  In addition, sellers would have to be able to 
prevent resales among consumers.96  Apple, Inc. would have to be able to prevent your 
 
90 Vartan J. Saravia, Shades of Gray: The Internet Market of Copyrighted Goods and a Call for the 
Expansion of the First-Sale Doctrine, 15 SW. J. INT’L L. 383, 398 (2009) (“Today’s online commerce, with 
reduced worldwide shipping charges and transaction costs, is the perfect breeding ground for some 
consumers and distributors to disrupt the price discrimination practices of manufacturers and distributors 
across international markets.”). 
91 Paul Samuelson explains:  
One could imagine every person in the community being indoctrinated to behave like a 
“parametric decentralized bureaucrat” who reveals his preferences by signaling in response to 
price parameters or Lagrangean multipliers, to questionnaires, or to other devices. But . . . by 
departing from his indoctrinated rules, any one person can hope to snatch some selfish benefit 
in a way not possible under the self-policing competitive pricing of private goods . . . .   
Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 31, at 389.  The term “Lagrangean multiplier” refers to a 
mathematical optimization technique which in this context could give information about true preferences. 
92 Mathew A. Edwards, Price and Prejudice: The Case Against Consumer Equality in the Information 
Age, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 593–94 (2006) (suggesting that price discrimination violates our right 
to privacy by exploiting our personal information). 
93 See, e.g., Lunney, Price Discrimination, supra note 82 (critiquing the partial equilibrium approach 
reflected in the price discrimination analysis); David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate 
and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and 
Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983 (2006) (identifying inefficiencies resulting from price 
discrimination in boiler plate contracts); Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 
TENN. L. REV. 317 (2002) (concluding that price discrimination is unconscionable); Michael J. Meurer, 
Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001) (concluding that price 
discrimination has negative and positive effects). 
94 See, e.g., Kieff, Coordination, supra note 83, at 422–23 (2006) (stating that IP rights facilitate price 
discrimination because of the doctrine of indirect infringement). 
95 Conley & Yoo, Nonrivalry, supra note 7, at 1810.  See also Samuelson, Pure Theory in Cowen, supra 
note 53, at 32 (“However, no decentralized pricing system can serve to determine optimally these levels of 
collective consumption . . . .  [I]t is in the selfish interest of each person to give false signals, to pretend to 
have less interest in a collective consumption activity than he really has.”). 
96 In ProCD, the Seventh Circuit explained: 
To make price discrimination work, however, the seller must be able to control arbitrage.  An 
air carrier sells tickets for less to vacationers than to business travelers, using advance 
purchase and Saturday-night-stay requirements to distinguish the categories.  A producer of 
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friend, who had no desire for an iPad or who was poorer than you, from buying an iPad at 
a lower price for you.  This arbitrage breaks down the efficiency of the price 
discrimination system.97 
IV. THE AVERAGE COST AND NET BENEFIT APPROACHES   
¶67 According to economic theory, the well-being of society's members is increased by 
increasing the production of any good as long as the additional benefits from production 
exceed the additional costs.98  For private goods, the price equals marginal cost principle 
provides guidance on how to achieve this optimum using competitive markets.  For pure 
public goods, none of the basic principles provide similar guidance.  The difficulty in 
balancing incentives and access has led some intellectual property scholars to suggest that 
incentives provided by intellectual property law should be sufficient to cover creators’ 
average costs99 (including a normal economic profit).  Other scholars, who prefer a cost-
benefit approach to defining intellectual property rights, ignore creators’ average costs.  
The following section considers that debate and opts for a net benefit rule—one that 
compares the benefits that would result from increased incentives to the benefits that 
would result from increased access to information. 
A. Average Costs versus Cost-Benefit 
¶68 The logic of covering creators’ costs in order to encourage investment in creative 
activity motivates some scholars to advocate exclusive rights designed to ensure that 
investment in creative activity is just profitable enough.  Professor Jeffrey Harrison offers 
 
movies segments the market by time, releasing first to theaters, then to pay-per-view services, 
next to the videotape and laserdisc market, and finally to cable and commercial tv [sic]. 
Vendors of computer software have a harder task.  Anyone can walk into a retail store and 
buy a box.  Customers do not wear tags saying “commercial user” or “consumer user.”  
Anyway, even a commercial-user-detector at the door would not work, because a consumer 
could buy the software and resell to a commercial user. 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996). 
97 Id. See also, e.g., Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the Not-For-Profit Sector, 52 
J.L. & ECON. 1, 11 (2009) (“[T]he feasibility of price discrimination depends on the cost of preventing 
arbitrage.”).  Cf.  Saravia, supra note 90, at 397(“Price discrimination is especially feasible in the case of 
intellectual property because individual works, given their originality, are not perfect substitutes for each 
other, and because either by law or by contract, the copyright owners may prevent or limit the arbitrage 
opportunities for resellers.”).  Mr. Saravia notes, however, that there is ample opportunity for competitors, 
distributors, or consumers to interfere with price discrimination schemes:  
For example, competing producers can disrupt price discrimination by luring away customers 
who otherwise would have paid a higher price to the copyright holder.  Likewise, distributors 
can interfere with price discrimination by performing intermediary functions in the arbitrage 
process.  Finally, users are able to disrupt price discrimination by hiding their preferences or 
seeking opportunities for arbitrage. 
Id. 
98 See RAGAN & THOMAS, supra note 61, at 522 (discussing the optimal amount of regulation being 
reflected in marginal cost equaling marginal benefit); JOHN B. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 
514 (1st ed. 1995) (“To determine the quantity of a government provided service, the marginal cost and 
marginal benefit of the service should be considered.”). 
99 See Kieff, Property Rights, supra note 83, at 727 (analyzing the particular utility of intellectual 
property law for creative work where there is a big difference between average cost and marginal cost); 
sources cited infra notes 101–105. 
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an analysis of incentives from the creator’s perspective stating that “as long as the 
creative effort is put forward, there is no need to incur costs to protect benefits beyond 
this minimum [necessary to cover costs].”100  The costs are those associated with the 
denial of access to some users.  The extra benefits—the extra earnings by the creator 
above average cost—do not inspire extra effort so they “are irrelevant to the author's 
decision-making.”101  If extra benefits produce no additional creative work but restrict 
access to the work, they are merely a burden to society.102 
¶69 Some scholars interpret this conclusion about incentives as implying that 
intellectual property rights should be defined so that creators will be able to cover their 
average costs.  Professor Lemley stated that the “minimum reward” appropriate to reward 
creators is the amount necessary for creators to recover their average total costs of 
producing the information.103  The basis for this amount is the market advantage a copier 
has over the creator.104  Because the copier does not have to incur the costs of producing 
the information, ensuring that the creator has sufficient exclusive rights to recover those 
costs creates a level playing field.  This level of return would presumably include both 
the revenue earned without formal legal protection and the additional revenue obtained 
through the legal monopoly resulting from exclusive rights.  A greater level of return 
would permit creators of intellectual property public goods to earn a greater return on 
investment than producers of private goods in a competitive market.105 
¶70 Alternatively, a cost-benefit analysis could be employed.  Court decisions and 
congressional amendments to intellectual property law are balancing incentives and 
access “at the margin.”  In doing so, they are evaluating whether the additional social 
benefits from increased incentives outweigh the increased social value of increased 
access.  Paraphrasing and generalizing from Professor Landes and Judge Posner’s106 
description of the optimal term of copyright protection, the rule for balancing incentives 
and access would be as follows: [T]he optimal level of intellectual property protection is 
determined by balancing at the margin the incentive effects of broader rights against the 
administrative and access costs arising from the public goods aspect of intellectual 
property.107  Landes and Posner were focusing on the incremental advantages of 
increasing incentives.  The benefits arose from increased creative activity while the costs 
 
100 Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Positive Externalities Approach to Copyright Law: Theory and Application, 13 
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 14 (2005).   
101 Id. 
102 Id. (“Any protection beyond the minimum necessary does not increase the social benefit of the work 
and is burdensome in terms of administrative, transaction, and exclusivity costs.”). 
103 Professor Lemley explains:    
[I]ntellectual property law is justified only in ensuring that creators are able to charge a 
sufficiently high price to ensure a profit sufficient to recoup their fixed and marginal 
expenses. . . .  Economic theory offers no justification for awarding creators anything beyond 
what is necessary to recover their average total costs. 
Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 2, at 1057.  
104 Id. at 1054–55. 
105 Id. at 1032 (“Competitive markets work not because producers capture the full social value of their 
output—they do not, except at the margin—but because they permit producers to make enough money to 
cover their costs, including a reasonable return on fixed-cost investment.”). 
106 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 
(2003).   
107 Id. at 476. 
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resulted from decreased access.108  One could equally balance at the margin the benefits 
from increased access against the costs of broader rights.  
¶71 Comparing the two approaches, the cost-benefit approach is preferable for several 
reasons.  First, the cost-benefit approach includes more relevant considerations.  The 
average cost approach does not consider either the social value of the creative work 
encouraged by incentives or the social benefits that would result from increased access.  
The optimal level of rights is appropriately determined by the social value rather than the 
magnitude of those investments.   
¶72 Second, a fundamental premise of a regime for market supply of intellectual 
property information is that no creator is assured that his or her costs are covered.  The 
creator is provided with the opportunity to make a profit if his or her information has 
sufficient social value.  Thus, the average cost approach is not descriptive of the structure 
of an intellectual property regime based on markets. 
¶73 Third, aside from those revenues available independent of exclusive rights, the 
costs an investor is willing to incur depends on the level of rights and will change 
depending on the protection granted.109  “Average cost” is a moving target.  If a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer can earn returns on its new drugs for only five years rather 
than twenty, it is likely to incur lower average costs in research and development.  If 
intellectual property rights are broad enough that a creator can charge everyone who 
receives any benefit from his or her work, he or she will invest more.  If there are no 
rights, creators will presumably invest less.110   
¶74 Because costs incurred depend on rights granted, the average cost approach does 
not identify what level of protection is desirable.  Balancing incentives and access on the 
margin gives a more refined analysis of both benefits and costs.   
B. The Net Benefits Approach 
¶75 A “net benefit” approach recognizes that incentives and access both have the 
potential to produce benefits and both can be viewed as costs.  Increased incentives may 
create more beneficial information, while increased access allows more people to benefit 
from it.  Increasing incentives makes access more costly and increasing access may 
decrease the amount of information produced.  While the “propertization” movement in 
intellectual property scholarship focuses on the exclusive rights associated with private 
property and highlights exclusion as a benefit, the opposing view focuses on the benefits 
of free access.111  A net benefit rule avoids characterizing one option as a cost and the 
 
108 Associated with the increased obstacles to obtaining access are the losses associated with denying 
people the benefits they would obtain from using the public good and the transaction costs of obtaining 
licenses to use the intellectual property.  Id.  In addition, there is the cost associated with the decreased 
creative activity from those people who would build on the creator’s work to produce additional intellectual 
property information. 
109 See Duffy, Isolationism, supra note 22, at 1077 (arguing that Lemley’s approach fails to provide any 
general basis for determining the appropriate level of intellectual property rights to grant). 
110 Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 2, at 1054 (“In a private market economy, individuals will not 
generally invest in invention or creation unless the expected return from doing so exceeds the cost of doing 
so—that is, unless they can reasonably expect to make a profit from the endeavor.”). 
111 For a few of the many scholars discussing this debate, see Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to 
Copy: Copyright, Creation, and Context, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477, 498–503 (2007); Richard A. Epstein, 
Liberty Versus Property?  Cracks in the Foundation of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005); 
Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 2; Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?  42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29 
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other as a benefit, but instead mediates between these extremes and is analytically 
identical to the cost-benefit approach.112 
¶76 Ultimately, both exclusive rights and free access have the potential to produce 
benefits.  Public goods theory and economic theory generally recommend allocating 
resources so as to maximize the net benefit of that allocation—choosing the option that 
produces the greater net benefit.113  As applied to intellectual property law, this means 
deciding whether the additional benefits resulting from extending creators’ exclusive 
control over some use of information are greater or less than the additional benefits from 
allowing greater access to users of that information.   
The Net Benefit Principle 
An increase in exclusive rights to intellectual property is justified only when the 
value of increased creative activity resulting from increased incentives is greater 
than the value of the benefits lost from reduced access. 
An increase in access to intellectual property is justified only when the value of 
the benefits resulting from increased access is greater than the value of decreased 
creative activity resulting from decreased incentives. 
This net benefit approach applies to judges deciding which party should prevail in an 
infringement action, legislators deciding to amend the law, and scholars deciding what 
legal policy is preferable from a public goods perspective. 
¶77 Following this approach, the analysis of any change in rights requires comparison 
of the incremental effect on incentives and the incremental benefits from expanded 
 
(2005). 
112 Although an explicit “net benefit” approach is not well-established in the intellectual property field, it 
is well recognized in other fields, such as environmental law, where policy makers are similarly concerned 
with a benefit cost analysis.  See David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 
335, 393–94 (2006) (stating that his proposed rule maximizes net benefits in the following sense: “[W]hen 
an agency writes regulations that generate costs exceeding benefits . . . it makes the net benefits of 
regulation negative.  Setting costs equal to benefits addresses this problem.”).  Professor Driesen cites:  
HORST SIEBERT, ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: THEORY AND POLICY 65 (5th rev. ed. 
1998) (maximum net benefit is reached when marginal abatement costs are set equal to 
benefits defined as marginal avoided damages); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE 
PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 18 (1993) 
(stating that “net benefits are maximized . . . where marginal costs equal marginal benefits.”); 
THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS 
IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 149–50 (1991), at 50, 61 (suggesting an optimality concept 
of net benefits by equating looking at more stringent options where costs would begin to 
outweigh benefits with maximizing net benefits).  
Id. at 393 n.313. 
113 The cost-benefit approach is analogous to the optimal level of output by a firm in a competitive 
market.  In microeconomic theory, a profit-maximizing producer of goods will expand production until the 
increases in revenue (marginal revenue) are outweighed by increases in cost (marginal cost).  This 
“marginal revenue equal marginal cost” approach does not yield the greatest possible revenue nor, by 
analogy, would a cost-benefit approach result in the greatest amount of intellectual property.  Revenue 
could be increased by producing more, but profits would be reduced because the revenue increases would 
be outweighed by greater cost increases.  The output of intellectual property information could be increased 
by another rule, but the associated costs would make it inefficient to do so.  See HIRSCHLEIFER, supra note 
60, at 180–87. 
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access.  The link between expanded exclusive rights and increased creative activity is not 
a direct connection.  The marginal benefit from expanded rights depends on the revenue 
response to changes in rights and the creativity response to changes in revenues.    
¶78 Extensions of exclusive rights do not always generate incentives resulting in 
increased creativity.  Advocates of the proposed Performance Rights Act,114 for instance, 
believe that the proposed legislation will generate new revenues for performers, who 
would be able to charge royalties for use of their covers of others’ music.115  However, 
the arguments in support of performance rights do not generally argue that the result will 
be more original performances, rather that it is equitable for composers to share their 
revenues with those who popularized their songs.116  Increased revenues for some may 
lead to a redistribution of wealth, rather than an increase in creativity.  Reserving to 
Major League Baseball the exclusive right to market baseball caps with trademark-
protected team logos117 is likely to increase its revenue, because there will be no 
competing sellers, but it may not lead to more investment in trademarking activity.  If 
optimizing the incentives/access tradeoff is the policy goal, there must be both a link 
between increased rights and increased revenues and a link between increased revenues 
and increased creative output to support expansion of intellectual property rights. 
¶79 Nor do exclusive rights always imply no access.  The marginal benefit from 
reduced rights depends on the benefits obtained by those who would not otherwise have 
been able to obtain access by compensating the rights holder.  Some grants of exclusive 
rights exclude only those who do not pay, while others exclude all users of a particular 
type.  An owner of patent rights excludes those who do not pay for the machine 
embodying the innovation or royalties for its use.  The loss from denied access is only the 
deadweight loss associated with those who are willing and able to pay the marginal cost 
of having the good provided to them but are not willing and able to pay the price charged 
by the rights holder.118  On the other hand, if a copyright holder has the exclusive right to 
prevent critical parodies of the copyrighted work, he or she is unlikely to license any such 
 
114 Performance Rights Act, H.R. 848, 111th Cong. (2009). 
115 Copyright law currently creates rights for composers of music and lyrics, who earn royalties from 
public performances of their works, 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006), but it does not create comparable rights for 
those who perform their music and lyrics. 
116 See Press Release, U.S. Congressman Howard Berman, Leahy, Hatch, Berman, and Issa Introduce 
Bipartisan, Bicameral Legislation to Give Fair Compensation to Musical Artists (Dec. 18, 2007), available 
at http://house.gov./list/press/ca28_berman/perf_rts_intro.shtml (focusing on “procedural fairness” and 
parity in the treatment of musicians performing their own work, for which they receive royalties and those 
performing other’s works, who currently do not).  See John Frega, Evaluating the Local Radio Freedom 
Act: How Will it Affect the Future of Radio in the United States, and Can It Harmonize American and 
European Copyright Protection?, 20 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. (forthcoming 2010) (illustrating the 
equitable issues in the division among composers and performers who made the compositions famous). 
117Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (1975) (holding 
that a manufacturer’s unauthorized sale of team emblems satisfied the elements for a cause of action for 
trademark infringement). 
118 This statement defines the deadweight loss that is the well-recognized result of creating a legal 
monopoly in the market for a creative work.  See Barnes, New Economics, supra note 15, at 39 
(“Economists refer to the costs associated with excluding such people as deadweight loss, which is 
measured by the difference between what they would have been willing to pay and the cost of supplying 
the good to them.”) (citations omitted); Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local 
Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579, 1598–99 (2003) (“Unfortunately, charging a positive price creates 
deadweight loss by denying some consumers access to the product even though the marginal benefits that 
they would derive from consuming it would exceed the marginal cost of allowing them to do so.”). 
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use and everyone will be denied access.  A trademark owner is unlikely to license any 
competitor wishing to use its mark in comparative advertising depicting the owner’s 
product in a truthful but unfavorable light.  The net benefit rule requires consideration of 
the value of the gained or lost creativity that flows from changes in rights as well as 
changes in benefits received from those who gain or are denied access.  
C. Net Benefit Approach in Contemporary Intellectual Property Law 
¶80 The net benefit approach is relevant to many fundamental intellectual property 
issues.  For instance, the doctrine of equivalents in patent law119 is based in part on the 
increased incentives effects of allowing inventors exclusive rights beyond the apparent 
literal scope of their patent claims.120  The Supreme Court concluded that the additional 
benefit associated with this expansion of rights outweighed the reduction in benefits 
associated with free access.  The Court recognized that adopting the doctrine of 
equivalents might deter other inventors from legitimate activities that are beyond the 
scope of the claims or trap people who mistakenly buy products covered by the broadly 
interpreted claim.121  Yet, from the Court’s perspective, the increase in valuable inventive 
activity from additional incentives created by broad interpretation outweighed the 
benefits from free access that would result from a narrower rule.122  Contemporary 
scholars similarly focus on the incremental incentive effects of patent rules.123 
¶81 Consideration of the incremental effects on access and incentives is not, however, 
widespread.  Intellectual property doctrines frequently overlook the need to focus on 
incremental effects on modifying rights.  The fair use doctrine in copyright, for instance, 
focuses on the total impact on the market for a copyrighted work rather than the marginal 
 
119 Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New 
Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1948 (2005) [hereinafter Meurer & Nard] 
(“Perhaps no doctrine in patent law is as controversial as the Doctrine of Equivalents (DOE), a common 
law creation that allows a court to expand patent scope beyond the rights literally claimed in the patent.”). 
120 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731–32 (2002) (applying the 
doctrine of equivalents and recognizing that “the language in the patent claims may not capture every 
nuance of the invention or describe with complete precision the range of its novelty.”).    
121 Id. at 732 (“If competitors cannot be certain about a patent’s extent, they may be deterred from 
engaging in legitimate manufactures outside its limits, or they may invest by mistake in competing products 
that the patent secures.  In addition the uncertainty may lead to wasteful litigation between competitors, 
suits that a rule of literalism might avoid.”). 
122 Id. at 732 (“Each time the Court has considered the doctrine [of equivalents], it has acknowledged 
this uncertainty as the price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation, and it has affirmed the 
doctrine over dissents that urged a more certain rule.”).  The Supreme Court further explains:  
If patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be greatly 
diminished.  Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements could defeat the 
patent, and its value to inventors could be destroyed by simple acts of copying.  For this 
reason, the clearest rule of patent interpretation, literalism, may conserve judicial resources 
but is not necessarily the most efficient rule.  The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal 
terms but instead embraces all equivalents to the claims described. 
Id. at 731–32.  
123 Muerer and Nard offer a utilitarian analysis of the doctrine of equivalents based on the view that the 
doctrine of equivalents allows inventors to avoid the costs of refining and revising their patent claims 
during patent prosecution.  Their theory leads to a conclusion that “a socially optimal patent policy should 
balance refinement cost savings and innovation incentives created by the DOE against the harm to 
competition and rent-seeking costs created by the doctrine.”  Muerer & Nard, supra note 119, at 1953.  
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impact on incentives.  The fourth and most important124 of the statutory factors relevant 
to whether an unauthorized use is fair is the extent to which the alleged infringer’s use 
interferes with the market for the copyright owner’s work.125  The greater the prospect of 
diminishing the revenues earned by the copyright owner, the less likely a court will 
consider the allegedly infringing use to be fair.  Fair use focuses on the marketability of 
the work.126  Even if a court is considering the impact on the market for derivative works, 
the focus is on the revenue effects.127  Copyright fair use is concerned with market 
substitution rather than incentives.128  This does not follow the net benefit rule.  From the 
net benefit perspective, the focus should not be on the extent of the effect on the market, 
but the extent of the effect on the copyright owner’s incentives.  The copyright fair use 
doctrine ignores the question of whether there is a link between enhanced revenues and 
enhanced creative output. 
¶82 Trademark law presents a slightly different tradeoff because strong exclusive rights 
benefit both the creator of a source-indicating symbol and, often, referential users of the 
symbol.  Consumers want to be sure that the mark refers to the goods of a particular type 
from a single source.  That does not mean that there is no tradeoff between incentives and 
access; the net benefit principle still applies.  The issue of Internet initial interest 
confusion illustrates the balancing process.  In these cases, search engines such as Google 
respond to a computer user’s entry of a trademarked symbol as a search term by 
displaying advertisements or sponsored links paid for by the trademark owner’s 
competitors.129  If the law permits keyword use of trademarks, the owner’s right to 
exclude is limited, and access without any compensation to the owner by competitors in 
these cases is expanded.   
¶83 The net benefit approach to the Internet initial interest confusion problem compares 
the incremental benefits from recognizing exclusive rights and from allowing free access.  
The social value of recognizing exclusive rights and prohibiting keyword advertising 
would be reflected in the social value of any increased incentives for trademark owners to 
 
124 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (“Finally, the Act 
focuses on ‘the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.’  This last 
factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”). 
125 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (“In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a 
fair use the factors to be considered shall include . . . (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work.”). 
126 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566–67. 
127 In Campbell, the Supreme Court explained:  
Evidence of substantial harm to [the copyright holder’s protectable markets for derivative 
works] would weigh against a finding of fair use, because the licensing of derivatives is an 
important economic incentive to the creation of originals . . . .  Of course, the only harm to 
derivatives that need concern us, as discussed above, is the harm of market substitution.  The 
fact that a parody may impair the market for derivative uses by the very effectiveness of its 
critical commentary is no more relevant under copyright than the like threat to the original 
market. 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 593 (1994) (citation omitted). 
128 Id. 
129 Some courts have held that this use of a competitor’s trademark may give rise to a trademark 
infringement claim.  See, e.g., Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 546 (6th Cir. 2006); Australian Gold, 
Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1238–39 (10th Cir. 2006); Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 
F.3d 808, 812–13 (7th Cir. 2002); Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 462 n.13 (2d Cir. 2004); 
Brookfield Comm'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999).  See also Eric 
Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507 (2005). 
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invest in source-indicating information and any increased ability for computer users to 
locate the website of a supplier of the particular goods sold under that mark.  The social 
value of access to the mark would be measured by any increased competition for the type 
of goods and services offered by the trademark owner and the ease of searchers finding 
those competitive alternatives.  
¶84 Recognizing the net benefits test creates a new agenda for research.  Applying 
public goods theory to intellectual property policy often leads analysts to assume that 
more intellectual property information will be produced if intellectual property rights are 
expanded.  But this depends on the rights/revenue and revenue/creativity links.  Public 
goods theory also leads analysts to assume that more access results from weakening 
intellectual property rights.  But this depends on how many people are excluded because 
they are unwilling to compensate the rights owner for the benefits they would obtain from 
access.  These qualifications are inevitable and unavoidable when determining the 
optimal level of intellectual property protection. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶85 Though it is the dominant economic approach to intellectual property law, the 
abstract principles from public goods theory are no more useful than principles from the 
theory of exchange of private goods.  The public finance economics roots of public goods 
theory do not explain how to structure the private exchange of intellectual property rights.  
The theory of exchange does not provide a practical and normatively acceptable way to 
allocate resources to the creation of intellectual property.  However, both theories inform 
the balance necessary to maximize the benefits to be obtained from defining legal rights 
to access and exclusion.   
¶86 Intellectual property economics identifies ways in which the market fails without 
providing general principles for addressing the incentives/access tradeoff.  Without some 
degree of exclusive rights, creators of intellectual property information have little 
opportunity to cover the costs of their investments beyond the benefits they obtain from 
personal use.  If users cannot feasibly be excluded from using intellectual property 
information, markets are unable to determine the optimal amount of creative work to 
supply.  Expansive exclusive rights are undesirable, however, because people who would 
obtain a benefit from the information that exceeds the cost of supplying the information 
to them might be denied that benefit.  The public finance theory of public goods theory 
and the theory of private exchange in competitive marks unsuccessfully describe 
standards for optimizing the output of public and private goods.  These standards are 
inapplicable to intellectual property, because they ignore the conflict inherent in the 
market supply of intellectual property information between short and long term goals, 
rest on the assumption that the government rather than a market will supply the 
information, or offer impractical and unappealing departures from normal market 
mechanisms for supply.   
¶87 The net benefits approach addresses the balance between creating incentives and 
promoting access.  Consistent with judicial and congressional emphasis on providing 
incentives to create with the ultimate objective of producing public benefits, the net 
benefits approach considers the incremental effect on incentives and on public benefits 
from expanding and contracting the extent, scope, and duration of rights.  The 
incremental approach is only partially recognized and implemented in intellectual 
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property policy analysis.  The Supreme Court’s discussion of patent law’s doctrine of 
equivalents reflects the net benefit approach, while a variety of doctrines in copyright 
law, such as fair use, and trademark law, such as initial interest confusion on the Internet, 
do not.  This article offers a framework for such an incremental analysis. 
